This proposal covers the period, 7/1/80 - 6/30/82, and is a continuation of RO1 HD13312-01 which terminates 6/30/80. It has the same principal objective, that is, the development of an aggregate model of household behavior that would be capable of specifying the conditions under which different household types are present in a community of intermarrying individuals. A micro analysis of two polar household types, dictatorial and symmetrical, serves as input into the present problem. As indicated in the Background section below, it is possible to justify the application of noncooperative game theory to the problem and that is the approach to be taken in the current grant period. In addition, an existence proof of a Nash noncooperative equilibrium is given in the present proposal. However, sole reliance on a noncooperative solution would be inadvisable since there may be phenomena it excludes. That leads to the present proposal in which two cooperative approaches, the Scarf algorithm for isolating equilibrium points in the core and Harsanyi's value model, will be applied. All theories I shall apply allow for nontransferable utility and for the specification of security utility levels (derived below). These security levels can be used in rigorously specifying status quo points in cooperative games; it is also possible to use them to derive dictatorial and subject solutions, an advance over earlier work on the problem. A potentially serious limitation of the above approaches is that they require all participants to have complete information. This extremely restrictive assumption shall be relaxed by applying the Harsanyi tracing procedure and the Hurwicz incomplete information model. Finally, the relationships between household types, on the one hand, and female labor supply and household saving, on the other hand, will be examined.